Members of the United Kingdom's House of Commons refer to their colleaguesin the chamber not by personal name but by the name of the constituencythey represent. This reflects oneof theirtwo main roles(Speaker's Conference on Parliamentary Representation, 2011,p.38; see also Morris, 2012) :(1) as legislators, debating, making and reviewing laws and government policy within Parliament; and(b) as advocatesfor the constituenciesthey represent. 2 The Report continues that: It is important to recognise that a Member's responsibilities rest jointly and concurrently at Westminster and in the constituency. It is a modern requirement of the job that a Member has an office in both places and there is a strong public expectation that when not required at Westminster, Members will actively participate in the life of the constituency.... 3 The intensity of thatconstituency role has increased very substantially in recent decades (Cain et al, 1987; Norton &Wood, 1993; Norton, 1994 Norton, , 1999 Norris, 1997; Gaines, 1998; Heitshusen et al., 2005; Childs and Cowley, 2011; Rush &Giddings, 2011 -see also Koop, 2012) ;most MPs now not only have a home there but also spend muchtime working with, in and forthe communities they represent. 4 Since 1944 the four UKBoundary Commissions have regularlyreviewed the map of constituenciesto ensure that theirboundariescontinue to meet the criteria set out in the Rules for Redistribution. 5 Those exercises includeda public consultation procedure, in which interested parties couldmake both written representations about the Commissions' proposals and oral submissions at LocalInquiries (Johnston et al., 2013) .Many MPs have done so, eithersupportingor opposing a proposal for their area, withtheir arguments for the latter usually being becauseitunnecessarily breaks up established communities, destroyswellestablished organisational structures and createsnew configurations that lack a sense of common identity and interests.In most cases they -or their party -have also presented counter-proposalswhich they claim better reflect the area's community structure.They cannot mention the likely electoral consequences of any changes because the Commissions' considerations are strictly non-partisan. However, amajor goal for parties is that their MPs are re-elected and so -as analyses of earlier redistributions show (Rossiter et al., 1999) -they use such community-based arguments to press their electoral causes.
When faced with a potential dislocation of the communitiesthey represent, therefore, MPs are faced with Hirschmann's(1970) classic choice set of 'exit, voice, and loyalty' (Pattie et al., 1997; Rossiter et al., 1999) . The loyalty option involvesacceptingthe Commission's proposals, either implicitly by making no representationsor explicitly through a positive submission welcoming them.A few may take the exit option,decidingeither to retire or to seek a seat elsewhere, althoughmost do soonlyafter deployingthe third option -voice. Parties wantto ensure that a reviewoutcome is as favourable as possible to their electoral interests and at recent redistributions theConservative and Labourparties have produced well-researched counter-proposalsfor each local area and mobilisedtheir MPs (along with local party officers,local government councillorsand others)to support thesewitharguments based almost invariably on community identification and the desire for continuity of representation. Promoting the MP's community role has thus become a highly significant feature of the public consultations -with the parties sometimes disagreeing on an area's communitystructure. 6 3 The same argument was also rehearsed during a debate on the Boundary Commissions' proposals in the House of Lords on 12 July, 2012 (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldhansrd/text/ 120712-0001.htm#12071248000733) 4 Morris (2012, 56) notes with surprise, however, there is no requirement that MPs live in their constituencies. The European Court of Human Rights has identified 'community ties' as an acceptable criterion that a local party can apply when selecting its candidates. She also notes (p.145) that one of the criteria for constituents demanding a recall election could be 'a delegate who does not pay attention to the wishes of the electorate ...
[failing] to speak properly on behalf of their constituents'. A draft Recall of MPs Bill was published by the UK government in December 2011 -http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm82/8241/8241.pdf -but this does not cover those issues, only (criminal) misconduct. 5 The House of Commons (Redistribution of Seats) Act, 1944 , 1949 and 1958 and the Parliamentary Constituencies Act, 1986 In the City of Portsmouth, for example, the Liberal Democrats hoped to retain one of the two seats in 2015, which was only feasible if one of the city's wards was split so that the city could have a North and a South seat rather than an East and West as in the Boundary Commission's initial proposals published in 2011. Cases were In 2011, Parliament passed the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act,which both reduced the number of MPs and changed the Rules for Redistributions. 7 All involved recognised that their application at the next review would disrupt the constituency map much morethan atits immediate predecessors (Johnston and Pattie, 2012; Rossiter et al., 2012a Rossiter et al., , 2012b : in England, for example, whereas in the previous redistribution only 77 of the 532 constituencies were changed by 50 per cent or more, that was the case with 203 in the Boundary Commission's 2011 proposals.The parties identified preferred configurations of seats for each area and mobilisedsupportfor their counter-proposals, ensuring that many MPs realised thesubstantial impact this could have on the communities they had developed close working relationships with.The exercise of MPs' voice in defence of their constituencies and communities should therefore have been a major element in thenew situationand this paper explores the extent to which theyused the voice option during that exercise, and whether variations in their participation were linked to electoral and community concerns.
UK Parliamentary redistributions
Until 2011, constituencies were designed, as far as possible, to comprise compact territorial units that fitted within the boundariesof local government areas (counties and boroughs), with each MP representing approximately the same number of electors: after1992 redistributions occurredevery 8-12 years. Continuity of representation was built-in to the system;a 1958 Actrequired the Commissions to take into account 'the inconveniences attendant on alterations of constituencies' and 'any local ties that would be broken by such alterations'. Organic criteria -the representation of communities -were thus paramountand the Home Secretary indicated that there was 'a presumption against making changes unless there is a very strong case for them ' (House of Commons Hansard, 582, 11 February 1958, col. 230) .Many of the recommended alterationsat subsequent redistributions were relatively minor: substantial changes were only proposed in local authorities where population change meant either an increase ordecrease in the number of seats (Rossiter et al., 1999; .
The 1958 Act also introduced a formal public consultation procedureincludingLocal Inquiries, held after submission of written representations about a Commissions' provisional recommendations. The Inquiries werechaired byan Assistant Commissioner,who advised the relevant Commission whether its proposals should be modified in the light of the evidence received. Over the next fifty years, those Inquiries were important forums for debating changesand the political parties became increasingly sophisticated in preparing cases to present there.
Afterthe 2001 general electionthe Conservative party began to question this system's efficacy. Although the Commissions arenon-partisan, nevertheless the outcomes of their work appeared to favour Labour,whichat each of the 1997, 2001and 2005 general elections not only gaineda disproportionate share of the seats relative to its share of the votes castbut made at the Public Hearing that the particular ward which the Liberal Democrats wanted to split comprised two separate communities with their own identity and facilities. Against that, the Conservatives -who hoped to win both of the city's seats at the next election -argued that the ward should not be split because it constituted a single community. 7 The Act also legislated for the May 2011 referendum on changing the voting system for UK general elections to the Alternative Vote.
was also much more favourably treated than the Conservatives would have been with the same vote shares (Johnston et al., 2001 (Johnston et al., ,2006 . This pro-Labour bias resultedfroma number of components of which one -although not the most important (Johnston et al., 2001; Rallings et al, 2008; Borisyuk et al., 2010; Thrasher et al., 2011 ) -was differences in constituency electorates. The Conservatives tended to win constituencies with above average electorates whereas Labour won in thesmaller seats,and that difference tended to grow over time -the general population trend was away from the smaller city seats where Labour dominated towards the larger, more ruralseats most of which were Conservativewon.
To remove this bias source, in 2010 the coalition government proposed changedRules for Redistributions. An arithmetic criterion was made the paramount factor;all seats (with four namedexceptionsreflecting special geographical circumstances -islands) had to have electorates within +/-5 per cent of a national quota, and only within that constraint could Commissions take organic criteria such as local authority boundaries, communities ofinterest and disruption from the previous pattern into account. (When calculated in 2011 the quota was 76,643,soall constituency electorates had to be between 72, 473 .) The Billalso reduced the number of MPs and increased the frequency of redistributionsto fit the quinquennial electoral cycle established by the Fixed Term Parliaments Act, 2011 (Johnston &Pattie, 2012) .
The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act, 2011, also changed thepublic consultation process. The government's initial intention was to abolish LocalInquiries and allowwritten representations only. Many within the political parties (especially Labour) opposed thisand after much debate in the House of Lords the government concededto their pressure (Johnston &Pattie, 2011) . Rather than reinstate LocalInquiries, which its spokesperson had characterised as 'not fit for purpose' and satisfying 'the urges of political parties to put their case at considerable length, but ... rarely successful in engaging the general public' (House of Lords Hansard, 8 February 2011, column 128) , however, it replaced them by Public Hearings (Johnston et al., 2013) . These, limited in both number and length,were to take place in the 5 th -10 th weeks of the 12-week period for making written representations after publication of initial proposals for an area(the previous Inquiries were held afterthe closing date for written submissions).
For the first review under the new rules these Hearings,held in late 2011 and early 2012, were as dominated by the political parties and their allies as their predecessor Inquiries (Johnston et al., 2013) . In England, for example, at the first -'Lead' -Hearing in each region all three political parties weregiven 40 minutes to present theiroverall response to the Commission's proposals, including anycounter-proposals. The remainder of the timethere and at most of the region's subsequent Hearings wasdominated by individuals (party officials, MPs, and elected councillors) mobilised to speakin favour of the party's overall case -either supporting the Commission's proposals or providing further advocacy for their party's counter-proposals. 8 At the outset of the exercise, the Commissions indicated that the constituency map would have to change markedly. In England, for example, only 200 of the then-current constituency electorates fell within the prescribed range and the Commissionswarned that many of these could not remain unchanged because of necessary alterations to neighbouring seatsthat fell outwith the range. Furthermore, all parts of the country were to lose seats: England's complement was to fall from 533 to 502, Scotland's from 59 to 52, and Northern Ireland's from 18 to 16;Waleswas to lose one-quarter of its 40 constituencies.
9 Many MPs therefore faced substantial changesto their constituencies: how did they respond?
MPs' representations
Fracturing of their constituency during a redistribution poses twoconsiderable potential threatsto MPs. First, it may make the seat less winnable at the next election. Secondly, irrespective of the new seat's 'winnability', boundary changes mean that continuity of representation and relationships -including with local authorities in the area -will be broken and new ones have to be established, alongside a restructuring of the MP's support base;the localparty organisationswould have to be rebuilt, for example. 10 In general terms, therefore, the greater the change to a constituency in the Commission's proposals the greater the likelihood thata party and its MP would challenge them.
In the new public consultationprocedure, MPs can make both a written representation within the twelve-week period and/or oral submissionsat the relevant region's Public Hearings. Data derived from Hearingstranscripts and the full set of written submissions published on the Commissions' websites show that 53per cent of all MPs followed one or both of those options (Table 1) .
11 Most usedonly onemode,and were twice as likely to make a written as an oral representation: 14 per cent of all 650 MPs both made a written representation and spoke at a Public Hearing.
There wasconsiderable variation across the parties in the extent of MPs' participation. Whereas sometwo-thirdsof Conservative and Liberal Democrat MPsmade representations, only42 per cent of Labour's MPs did so; oral representations were much more common among Liberal Democrat MPs. NoNorthern Ireland MPs made any representation: one oral submission was presented as being on behalf of an MP, who wouldbe submitting a written representation -but he did not.
12 In Wales, none of the three Plaid Cymru MPs either spoke or wrote, and in Scotland only one SNP MP wrote and none spoke.(The response rate was generally low in Scotland: two-thirds of MPs made no representations, compared to 55 per cent of Welsh MPs and 42 per cent of England's.)
That almost half of MPs played no direct part in the public consultation process, given the major disruption involved, is perhaps surprising. To establish whether those whose seats were little altered were less likely to make representations, an Index of Change was calculated for each existing constituencywhich varied from 0 -no change -to 100 -the maximum possible.Aconstituency with 51 per cent of its voters allocated toone proposed new constituencyand 49 per cent toanother hadan index close to 100;for one with 98 per cent allocated to one of the new constituencies and 1 per cent each to two others it was close to zero.(A full description of the index isin Rossiter et al., 2012.) The final column of Table 2 shows the number of constituencies according to a classification based on thatindex (Northern Ireland andthe seats represented by the Speaker and the Green Party -neither of whom made any representation -are excluded from this and later tables). There was an index of zero for 181seats,which includes both those constituencies that neither lost nor gained electors from the previous set plus those where the existing constituency remained intact but additional electors were added to bring it within the size range. Few of the others were changed only slightly (an index of1-10) andover 100 hadan index of 76 or more, indicating very substantial dismemberment of the existing seat. The other columns indicate the percentage of MPs in those seats according to the nature of their submissions. Although there are some clear trends -notably the increasing percentage of MPs who made both types of submission the greater the proposed change -there are also some surprises, not least the absence of any difference in the proportion of affected MPs who made no submission between the unchanged seats and those with the greatest amount of change.
Two reasons can be suggested for these findings. The first applies to the relatively large number of submissions received regarding seats that were to be either unchanged or only marginally so. The Boundary Commissions encourage positive as well as negative representations, andmany of those received commended the proposals and encouraged the relevant Commission not to change them. In some cases theincentivefor a positive response may have been that anMP'sparty feared that opponents wouldseek changesto the proposed seat,to itselectoral disadvantage,so a submission was desirable to sustain the Commission in its original intention.In addition, someMPsmay see even proposed minor changesas disadvantageous -splitting an established community, for example -and suggest an alternative, probably only slightly different from that proposed.
To evaluate these potential explanations MPs' submissionswere assessedas to whether they werepositivelyor negativelydisposed towardsthe proposal for their current constituency. 13 We expectedthat the smaller the amount of change proposed, the greater the probability of a positive response, whichTable 3 supports. Although24 per cent of all MPsexpressed approval, there were substantial differences depending on the amount of change proposedin the expected direction. Where the Index was zerothose MPs who responded were over three times more likely to approve of the proposal than object to it: wherechange was very substantial, they were six times more likely to oppose than favour it.
The second potential explanation concernstheabsenceof submissions fromsome MPs representing seats subject to substantialchange.
14 Extensive change may not significantly alter a seat's 'winnability' for the MP's party, providingno stimulus to oppose it. Nevertheless, even if that were the case, the community that the MP formerly represented 13 For example, at the Exeter Public Hearing Ben Bradshaw MP spoke in favour of the proposal for his Exeter constituency, which was to be unchanged, but also in favour of the Labour party's counter-proposals for Plymouth: his response is treated as a positive one here. 14 Some may have already decided to retire at the next general election and so leave the issue to their party. may be fractured. Given the MP's role as community advocate, this would seem undesirable -even if the outcome waselectorally favourable -but the MP may be reluctant to challenge the proposals publicly (even if her/his party does). If an MP tells a Public Hearingthat, in effect, 'I don't want to represent these people' (residents of wards formerly outwith the MP's constituency 15 ) but the Commission's final decision does not change the proposal, some 'new' voters may not be favourably inclined towards the candidate now seeking their support. 16 Silence may be the better strategy in such circumstances, especially if there is no likely negative electoral consequence.
To evaluate this argument, we used estimates ofthe electoral complexion of each proposed new constituencyif the 2010 electionhad beenheld in those new seats.
17 Each MP was allocated to the new constituency which included the largest component of her/his current seat.The expectation was that, however much change was proposed, the safer the new seat for the 'incumbent MP',whom we assumed would be the party's candidate there, the less likely that he or she would make a submission. 18 Further supporting evidence isthe percentage of MPs who did respond -according to both the extent of proposed change to their current constituency and the marginality of their 'new' one -and who spoke/wrote against the Commissions' proposal. Because of a small number of constituencies in some cells, the percentages in Table 5 are only reported for rows containing ten or moreseats.The more marginal thenew seat, the greater the probability that an MP spoke and/or wrote against the Commission's proposal.
Evaluating the pattern and nature of the voice option
Tables 2-5 largely support the arguments adduced here regarding which MPs usedthe voice option.Some of the factors considered may be inter-related, however(seats held by Labour MPs may be more fractured on average, for example, since the proposed amount of change to the constituency mapwas greatest in urban areas: Rossiter et al., 2012) , so the interpretations 15 In most cases -the main exception is Scotland (Rossiter et al., 2012 ) -the constituency building-blocks are local government wards, whose electoral composition is known. 16 We are grateful to Lewis Baston for raising this possibility with us. 17 These data were computed by Anthony Wells of YouGov, using a method based on that developed by Rallings and Thrasher (2007) for estimating party strength in each new constituency. They are available on his website at http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/. We are grateful to him for permission to use them here. 18 One example of this, concerns the Till and Wylye Valley ward in Wiltshire, part of the current Salisbury constituency. Local councillors opposed moving the ward into the proposed Warminster and Shaftesburyseat, and apparently gained the support of their local Conservative MP, John Glen (according to the Salisbury Journal: http://www.salisburyjournal.co.uk/news/salisbury/ salisburynews/9311418. Political_foes_join_forces_to_fight_boundary_changes/). There were 36 written representations from within the Salisbury constituency, all but two of which objected to that specific proposal; an objection was also made on behalf of the local Conservatives (the objector said that local Liberal Democrats agreed with him) but their MP made no representations, and the issue was not raised in the Conservative party's overall regional response. It was, however, raised by the Liberal Democrats (and their MP for the nearby Chippenham seat), who proposed a switch of wards between the two constituencies that would keep Till and Wylye Valley in the Salisbury seat. were checked by two binary logistic regressions;both excluded Northern Ireland MPs,the Speaker and the single Green Party MP,plus the three Plaid Cymru and sixSNP MPs (because of the small number of cases;only one of the ninemade a submission). Four sets of independent variables were included: country, party, index of change, and the proposed constituency's estimated marginality. As all are categorical variables, the coefficients contrast each group with a comparator; Table 6 gives the regression coefficients, their statistical significance and the associated exponent.
The first regression (Table 6 -columns 1-2) contrasted those among the 621MPs who made a submission (oral or written, or both -coded 1) with those who did not (coded 0). The goodness-of-fit coefficients indicate a substantial improvement between the final model (with all variables included) and the null model (with membership of the categories randomly allocated): the percentage of the observations correctly classified increases from 56 to 65. Scottish MPs were less likely to make a submission than their English counterparts, though this difference was only marginally significant; there was no significant difference between English and Welsh MPs. There was no difference in rates between Conservative and Liberal Democrat MPs, but a very substantial, and highly significant, one between Conservative(and also, by implication, Liberal Democrat) and Labour MPs; the latterwere only 0.36 as likely to make a submission as their Conservative contemporaries.
MPs representing constituencies for which the proposals involved substantial fracturing (Index values of 51-90) were at least twice as likely to make a submission as those whose seat was either to remain unchanged or (by implication) be little changed. But -as indicated in Table 2 and discussed earlier -the relatively small number representing seats facing the largest amount of change were no more likely to make representations. Finally, those whose new seats would be extremely safe for the party at the next election were only just over halfas-likely (an exponent of 0.56) to make a submission as those whowould be faced with defending an extremely marginal constituency.
The second regression (Table 6 , columns 3-4) looks only at those 345MPs who made a submission: the dependent variable is whether that submission was against (coded 1) or for (coded 0) the Commission's proposal. Again, the goodness-of-fit statistics show that the full model accounts for a substantially larger proportion of the variation than the null model, with statistically significant coefficients for all four independent variables. The first group again shows no difference between English and Welsh MPs, but their Scottish counterparts were much less likely to make a negative submission compared to the English -an exponent of just 0.21. Both Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs who made representations were more than twice as likely to be against the proposals astheir Conservative counterparts. The differences according to the Index of Change were even larger: the greater the proposed change the greater the probability that the MP opposed it -about twenty times greaterfor those representing seats with the most change as against those with least. Finally, the safer the seat that the MP was likely to 'inherit' the smaller the probability of a negative.
Accounting for inter-party variations
These findings are very largely in line with expectations. But why were Labour MPs much less likely to participate?It wasnot because they were less affected by the changes overall: 26 per cent of all Labour MPs represented constituencies with an Index exceeding75, compared to 12 and 17 per cent for their Conservative and Liberal Democrat counterparts respectively. Nor were they any more likely to be allocated safe seats: 43 per cent of Labour MPs would 'inherit' seats with winning margins of 20 percentagepoints or more compared to 45 per cent of Conservatives,although the percentage wasjust 14 forLiberal Democrats.
The probable reason lies in the three parties' approachesto the redistribution. At the Fourth Periodic Review (1990 Review ( -1995 the Labour party pioneered anintensive approach to redistributions, mobilising local support behind its counter-proposals (with major party figures ensuring that MPs and local activists followed the party line); as a result, itwas able to persuade the Commissions to recommendrevised proposals that were more to Labour's electoral advantage (Rossiter et al., 1999) . For the 2011redistribution the Conservatives were much better prepared than their opponents, however: party officials had workedon the new rules before the legislation was introduced and undertook a great deal of preparatory work, with regional officials mobilising MPs and others to support their counter-proposals at the Public Hearings and in written representations. Labour, by contrast, had a much lower profile at the Hearings -in part reflecting both the party's financial condition and its lack of political leadership committed to the task. The official who handled the previous review presented its case at all of the Lead Hearings in England and Wales, but rarely stayed for the rest of that day, let alone the full Hearing, and did not attend the later Hearings. (Johnston et al., 2013) .
A clear illustration of the relative weakness of Labour's participation was in the Yorkshire and the Humber region. Because of problems created by large ward sizes in Sheffield and Leeds,the degree of fracturing of many existing constituencies there was substantial (Rossiter et al., 2012) :although eleven Labour MPs had unchanged constituencies in the Commission's proposals, 13 of the other 21 were in seats with Indexesexceeding50 (nine of the region's Conservatives held seats withsimilar high values, and only one represented an unchanged seat). But the Labour party presented no counter-proposalsat the Lead Hearing; its presentation and supporting document simply 'reserved its position',as did its later written submissionwhichincluded statements, such as that referring to the Hull area: 'We do not ... believe that there is any perfect solution to these problems and would reserve our position on any counter proposal that may be made'. The relevant section of the document ended with statements that
The Labour Party does not wish at this stage to make any objections to these proposals, although we understand the scale of disruption which they would imply for the representational patterns in the region and We will again reserve our position on any counter proposal that may be made, knowing that any alternative is likely to bring its own anomalies and disruption. The clear implication is that there was disagreement across the region regarding any alternative configuration. As a result, only 28 per cent of the regions' Labour MPs made a submission, 20 compared to 58 per cent of Conservative and two of the region's three Liberal Democrat MPs.
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A further indicator of Labour's difficultieswas thatsome of its MPs supported counterproposalswhichhad not been submitted by the party.InScotland,where the party also 'reserved its position' withnocounter-proposalsin its post-Hearings document, five MPs and one constituency party spoke against the Commission's recommendations:one MPspeaking on behalf of 'myself, my local party and my constituents' -notedhe had been provided with data and maps by the Scottish Labour partywhen preparing his counterproposal;another agreed with contributions made regarding constituencies in the Dundee area by Conservative and Liberal Democrat representatives.Finally, in the Northeast region of England, the party's presentation to the Lead Hearing indicated approval for five of the 26 proposed seatsand suggested alternatives for eightmore, but 'reserved its position' on the remaining 13; a counter-proposal for five of those 13 was separately presented by a local MP, supported by three others.Labourwas clearly divided over the proposals and possible alternatives in some areas: some MPs made representations on their own behalf but there was no mobilisation behind a common 'party line'. There was much greater unity in the other partiesand greater mobilisation of MPs' voice.
One furtherpossible explanation of the lack of participation by some MPs is that frontbencherswereless inclined to make representations, especially if they wanted to oppose party policy for their seat, whereas others may have been content to leave their cause to be fought by party officials and local councillors. There is no evidence to sustain this argument, however. Of the 23Conservatives who were either membersof or entitled to attend Cabinet at the time, 12made a submission. Only one Liberal Democrat Cabinet member did;the other fourwere all 'inheriting' relatively safe seats (as wereall but two of theirConservative colleagues). And members of Labour's Shadow Cabinet were as likely to make representations as backbenchers -even though, as with their opponents on the opposite front bench, most were 'inheriting' safe seats.
The nature of the representations
There was no 'standard model' forMPs' oral or writtenevidence. Some who supported a Commission's proposalwere relatively brief: for example, Ben Bradshaw, MP for Exeter, which was to be unchanged, wrote a one-page letter supportingthe Commission'sdecision to retain a seat comprisingthe entire urban area -the 'city's interests ... are often quite different from those of far flung rural Devon'. Kenneth Clarke was even briefer: his constituency was to be substantially dismantled (an Index of 72) but he accepted the change without demur and merely suggested an alternative name for the new seat. Dawn Primarolo simply stated that 'I support the Boundary Commission's proposals for Bristol' and Grant Shapps that 'the Karl Turner, indicated general acceptance of the proposal for his seat; Linda Riordan suggested alternatives for Halifax and Calderdale seats; and Hugh Bayley suggested minor changes to his York Central seat. In his oral presentation Mike Wood, member for Batley and Spen, said that he and his office were working on a proposal which would be submitted later and would keep his current constituency intact (this was presented by the Kirklees Labour party at the Hull hearing); his written representation suggested that if the current proposal was retained it should be renamed and appended a petition asking the Commission to 'keep the town of Batley and the village of Birstall united in one parliamentary constituency'. An alternative scheme -believed to be that developed for, but not agreed by, all local Labour parties in South and West Yorkshire, and presented in a written submission by the Shipley constituency party, kept the two Batley wards together but separate from Birstall.
proposals as regards Hertfordshire are sensible and will ensure that the representation is enhanced by having constituencies of an appropriate and equal size'. Others were less concise: Sir Bob Russell's Colchester seat was recommended as unchanged, but he made a lengthy presentation at the Public Hearing rehearsing the town's history,character and parliamentary representation,plushis own long links with it.
An approach focusingon communities was adopted by many MPs who opposed a Commission's proposals. Their goal -illustrated by Jo Swinsonat two of the Scottish Hearings 22 -was to establish the strength of communities that wouldbe splitby the proposals,whichshe did in part by usingquotations from her constituents. Such advocacy also had a public relations component: their MP was indicating to her constituents thatshe wished to continue representing them -something that may be picked up by thelocal media. A similar tactic was deployed by some supporters ofproposed,especially relatively small, changes: Peter Bone noted that 'in an ideal world I would have preferred to retain the whole of the existing constituency ... [especially oneward]to remain within the constituency, [but] I do understand on the basis of the number of voters and its location that it will have to be moved' (he did propose a minor change elsewhere); and David Burrowes said that it was 'disappointing to lose the connection' with one ward. 23 Others welcomed wards being added to their constituencies -Angie Bray noted that one new ward 'fits like a glove' with another already in her constituency.And whatever their response to a specific proposal anumber of Conservativesindicated -likeNadine Dorries -that 'I am supportive of the objective to equalise constituencies and recognise the need to reduce the number of MPs'.
Most MPs who opposed a Commission's proposals took one of two courses: havingindicated the elementsof the recommended constituency they felt unsuitable -almost always on community ties grounds -theyeither made a counter-proposalor indicated support for one put forward in another submission, in most cases from their party. The latter strategy was especially notable in the oral representations at the Public Hearings, where some set out the case for a change in detail:SteveWebb, for example,argued forsubstantial changes to the proposals forSouth Gloucestershire on the basis of community ties.(A Liberal Democrat, his majorityin 2010 was14.8 per cent;theproposed constituency he would 'inherit' was estimated to have a Conservative majority of 2.2 per cent.) Liam Byrnepresented a substantial document detailing social and economic conditions inhisBirmingham constituencyand the programmes being taken to counter them, characterised by 'strong political leadership,and a strong partnership between local politicians, the member of parliament, and the community',that would be disrupted by the proposed change.
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22 She spoke at two because she wanted a constituency that included sections of two local authorities that were considered at separate Hearings. 23 A further reason why MPs may have wanted to express their regret at 'losing' some constituents was their uncertainty whether the redistribution would be implemented. They may have seen little point in their involvement if the exercise was doomed to fail because whatever was proposed would be voted down by Parliament in 2013. Labour was committed to voting against them and some Conservative 'rebels' threatened their own party that they might also if it made too many concessions to its coalition partners (who in summer 2012 indicated that they would vote against)!Almost all MPs confined their contributions to either or both of a written statement and an oral representation, but Paul Farrelly (whose seat hada2010Labour majority of 3.6 per cent but estimates suggested that its 'successor' would have had a Conservative majority of 16.6 per centthen), attended both days of the relevantHearing;as well as making his own submission he questioned eleven of the other witnesses (some at length).Alan Duncan wrote on 6 October 2011 commending the Commissionfor not proposingany changes to his constituency. He then appeared at the localHearing on 1 November, 'to fend off a [Liberal Democrat] counter-proposal which I think is nothing short of mischievous', 25 andsubmitted a further letter on 15 November, enclosing a newspaper cutting showing that the local Liberal Democrats opposed what their regional party had put forward as a counter-proposal 'without first consulting the local committee'.
Not all MPs either commended the proposals or offered a counter-proposal, however. In his oral submission, Chris Huhne focused entirely on the splitting of multi-ward parishes in the proposed constituency, which would divide communities. No counter-proposal was offered either then orin his subsequent written submission, towhich he appended the results of a local opinion poll thatsustained his arguments; nor did he mention his party's counterproposals.Others justasked the Commission to think again.Hillary Benn, for example, illustrated how the proposals for Leeds split communities and the rules made it 'extremely hard [for the Commission] to come up with a plan that works': he followed his party's line by reserving his position, and was encouraged by the Assistant Commissioner to make the Commission's task 'easier in trying to come up with the next set of proposals' if there were 'a commonality of view between the parties'!Another Leeds MP, Fabian Hamilton,urged the Commission 'to rethink this particular proposed constituency and to consider splitting one or two local authority wards in order to make the required numbers add up'.(Hillary Benn was dubious about splitting wards because 'you breach community links in a different way at the local level'.)
Conclusions
United Kingdom MPs actas advocates for theindividuals, businesses, local governments, communities and interest groupsin their constituencies: they develop close links with local people and organisations and maintain high public profiles there -identifying with the place(s) they represent and fostering a sense of local identity. The longer their constituency remains unchanged, or virtually so, the closer that symbiosisand the stronger their local party organisation.In recent decades, many MPs have benefitedfrom long-term continuity in the electoral map.In 2011, however, a review of constituency boundaries following a major change to the rules for their definition, combined with a reduction in the numberof seats, resulted in proposed extensive changes to many constituencies. Many MPs realised thatmuch effort would be needed not only building up new relationships but also reworking the local party organisation on which they depended;in many casesthe proposed changes also impactedon their re-election prospects.
The review's public consultationarrangements invitedMPs to make oral and/or written representations about the proposed new constituency boundaries. Most who did so worked in collaboration with their national and regional party organisations, whichhad prepared detailed responses with counter-proposals for constituenciesthat better suited their electoral interests.At the Public Hearings, party officials provided an overall introductory sketch map andMPs and other party members were mobilised to fillin the local detail,portraying organic wholes -territorially-defined communities -whosesundering would make the representation of local concerns more difficult.
Not all MPs participated in this procedure, however, manyapparently because either their current constituency was wholly orlargely unaffected by the proposals or their electoral prospects were not significantly reduced.In addition, Labour MPs were less active than their Conservative and Liberal Democrat counterparts,largely because the party was less able to mobilise their support for counter-proposals.Few MPs participated in Scotland, with those representing the SNP (like their Plaid Cymru counterparts in Wales) almost entirely silent; presumably thosetwo parties generally felt they had little to gain from making counterproposals -as in Northern Ireland, where none of the 18 MPs made anyrepresentation.
And the future?
Publication of the Commissions' revised proposals in autumn 2012 provideda further opportunity for comment -an eight-week period for written representations only.
26 Whether MPs wouldbecome much involved was doubtful, however, because of uncertainties regarding the probability of the new constituencies being used for the 2015 general election.
27
In August 2012 the Liberal Democrat leader and Deputy Prime Minister indicated that, because the Prime Minister had indicated that the Conservative partycould not provide the necessary support in the House of Commons for the House of Lords Reform Bill, introduced in June 2012, he would be instructing Liberal DemocratMPs to vote against implementation of the Boundary Commissions' final recommendations when they were laid before the House in October 2013. 28 The likelihood of a positive votefor the new constituencies without that support was small;consequently,although the Commissions' reviewscontinued,each of the main parties decided to select candidates for 2015 in the existing constituenciesand the Conservatives outlined their target seat strategy, which significantly reduced the stimulus for further MP involvement in the review.
The future situation is unclear,therefore, although unless the Act is either repealed or amendedbefore October 2013the Commissions must complete their task and the government lay their recommendations before Parliamentplus an Order implementingthem. If those Orders are voted down and no further action taken, the current legislation requires the Commissions to undertake a further review and recommend a new set of 600 constituencies to Parliament by October 2018. If a Conservative government is elected in 2015 that exercise will probably form the foundationfor the Commissions' work -although the number of seats allocated to two or more of the four countries (and/or two or more of England's nine regions) may change, necessitating substantial fracturing of seats that were designed but never used. If a Labour government, or a coalition government with Labour the major party, takes power in 2015, however, the 2011Act will probably be either amended or repealed;the next 26 There was an earlier period for written submissions after publication of the Hearings transcripts and the initial written representations. The Commissions received 111 (none again in Northern Ireland): almost all were opposing a counter-proposal from another party, 33 from MPs who had not made a submission in the earlier round. 27 Those submissions will not be published until the final report, due by October 2013. 28 This was debated at some length on 3 September 2012: see House of Commons Hansard for that day, columns 36-53. Coefficients that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better are shown in bold: those significant at the 0.05-0.10 level are in italics.
